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enact similar legislation and thus afford adequate protection for the
individual's right of privacy while at the same time permitting ef-
fective law enforcement within the bounds of the law.
MALCOLM BOBB BURTON
SECTION 3o1(a) AND PRE-EMPTION UNDER
TAFT-HARTLEY
Due to the increased governmental regulation of labor relations
at both the federal and state levels, troublesome problems of su-
premacy and accommodation between state and federal laws arise.
In any broad field of action, unless the statutes are absolutely explicit,
the question always arises as to whether Congress has pre-empted the
field.
In section 3oi(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,' Con-
gress has authorized the federal courts to entertain "suits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization represent-
ing employees in an industry affecting commerce." 2 Since there is no ex-
plicit indication that the federal courts are granted exclusive jurisdic-
tion, the problem is presented as to whether section 3o(a) pre-empts
the states from asserting jurisdiction.
In the recent case of Charles Dowd Box Co. v. CourtneyP this
problem was presented. The defendant, an employer engaged in an
'-"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any dis-
trict court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or with regard to the citizenship or the parties." Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § 3o1(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
2Section 2(6) of the Labor Management Relations Act declares: "When used
in this subchapter-The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce, trans-
portation or communication among the several States, or between the District
of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory,
or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Colum-
bia, or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the
same State but through any other State or Territory or the District of Columbia or
any foreign country." Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § 2(6),
61 Stat. 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1958).
8368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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industry affecting interstate commerce,4 agreed to a new collective
bargaining agreement through his representatives. This new agree-
ment signed by both the defendant's representatives and the plaintiff-
union's representative provided for wage increases and other changes
in respect to vacations and holidays5 The employer first announced
to his employees that he would put the new agreement into effect,
but a few weeks later notified his employees of his intention not to go
through with the arrangement and instead to rely on their prior
agreement.
The defendant contended that his representatives had acted with-
out authority and that the plaintiff-union had such knowledge. The
union then brought an action in the Superior Court of Massachusetts
asking for a judgment declaring that a valid collective bargaining
agreement did exist and for an order enjoining the employer from
terminating or violating it.
The defendant's answer stated that "by reason of section 301(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act, the state court had no jurisdic-
tion over the controversy." 6 The Superior Court of Massachusetts re-
jected the attack upon its jurisdiction.7 On appeal the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the lower court's holding, ex-
pressly ruling that section 3o(a) had not made the federal courts the
exclusive arbiters of suits for violation of contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor union.8 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to consider the important question of federal law.9
It affirmed the holding of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts that the courts of that state had jurisdiction in'the case. 10
The defendant relied principally on Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills," to bolster his contention that the state courts were pre-
empted from asserting jurisdiction. In that case the Supreme Court,
'The petitioner was an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in § 2(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act. See note 2 supra.
368 U.S. at 504.
6Ibid.
7 T7he trial court rejected the attack upon its jurisdiction; determined on the
merits that the collective bargaining agreement was valid and binding on the
parties thereto, and entered a money judgment in conformity with the wage pro-
visions of the agreement.
"In the absence of a clear holding by the Supreme Court of the United States
that Federal jurisdiction had been made exclusive, we shall not make what would
be tantamount to an abdication of the hitherto undoubted jurisdiction of our own
courts." 341 Mass. 337, 169 N.E.2d 885, 887 (196o).
9365 US. 8o9 (1961).
"368 U.S. at 506.
"353 U.S. 448 (1957)-
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seven justices concurring, one dissenting,12 held that section 3o of the
Labor Management Relations Act provided direct authority to grant
petitioner-trade union's bill for specific performance of the arbitra-
tion provisions of a collective bargaining agreement with respondent-
employer.' 3 In the majority opinion five members of the Court went
beyond the narrow holding14 and stated that section 301 "authorizes
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement
of... collective bargaining agreements...1.5
The defendant contended that the Lincoln Mills decision holds
that section 301 is more than jurisdictional. He argued that it requires
federal courts to "fashion" a common law of collective bargaining
from the policy of the national labor laws and therefore to allow state
jurisdiction would be to frustrate the rationale of Lincoln Mills.
The Supreme Court of the United States found nothing to indicate
that Congress adopted such a policy in enacting section 301, in spite
of the merits of the defendant's contention.' 6 Rather, the Court re-
lied mainly on the legislative intent it could piece out of the 1947
congressional debates. It found that "the legislative history of the
enactment nowhere suggests that, contrary to the clear import of the
statutory language, Congress intended in enacting section 301(a) to
deprive a party to a collective bargaining contract of the right to seek
redress for its violation in an appropriate state tribunal."'17
Though the Supreme Court's finding as to Congress's intent is un-
questionable, the effect of section 301(a) will provide a considerable
obstacle to effectuating the rationale of Lincoln Mills.
Although the Supreme Court has applied the Dowd Box Co. case
in subsequent decisions,' 8 it nevertheless, must strain traditional doc-
'2Mr. Justice Black did not participate.
"Specific performance had been granted in the original district court proceed-
ing, but the decree had been reversed on appeal, 23o F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), on
the ground that although the district court had jurisdiction under § 3oi of the
Labor Management Relations Act, there was neither state nor federal substantive
law on which to base the requested relief.
"Justices Burton and Harlan agreed only that § 3oi provided authority for
a grant of specific performance of the arbitration agreement. Since this was the only
issue before the Court, it is possible that the holding of the case may be limited to
this issue alone. This is doubtful, however, since five Justices, a majority of the
Court, thought it necessary to the decision to say what they did about the nature
of rights under § 301.
15353 U.S. at 451.
16'Whatever the merits of this argument as a matter of policy, we find nothing
to indicate that Congress adopted such a policy in enacting § 3o1." 368 U.S. at 507.
17lbid.
'8Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962); Local 174,
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)-
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trines in order to apply federal law. For example, in Retail Clerks In-
ternational Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc.,19 the Court held that a
union's action on a strike settlement agreement, even though it is not
a collective bargaining agreement,20 is a suit for a violation of a
"contract" under section 301 (a). The manner in which the Court
strained to include the strike settlement agreement within the scope
of "contracts" of section 301(a) so as to allow federal jurisdiction seems
to indicate the obstacle it will face in order to follow the rationale
of Dowd Box Co. and Lincoln Mills.
As the Lincoln Mills case is still good law and since the federal
judiciary has not pre-empted the field, both the state and lower fed-
eral courts have the difficult task of working with a law that has not
yet been developed.21 The inherent uncertainty of such a develop-
ment was presented in the case of McCarroll v. Carpenters Union.
22
In that case suit was brought in a California state court to enjoin a
strike in breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Judge Traynor
realizing that he was bound to apply the federal law under Lincoln
Mills, was unable to find any statement or exposition of what that
law might be. As the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits a federal court
from enjoining such a strike2 3 and since the statute is only directed
at removing jurisdicton from the federal courts, Judge Traynor de-
dared that he would assume both the state and federal law to be the
same and granted the injunction.24
The dilemma in which the California court was placed will cer-
tainly face other state courts in the future. Therefore, the rationale
10369 U.S. 17 (1962).
2 The District Court held that Congress limited the scope of § 3oi(a) jurisdiction
to contracts that are "collective bargaining contracts." Only agreements concern-
ing wages, hours and conditions of employment concluded in direct negotiations
between employers and unions were within its scope. 179 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ohio
196o).
"Indicative of this problem is McCarroll v. Carpenters Union, 49 Cal. 2d 45,
315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
=Ibid.
27This position was adopted by A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarer's Union, 25o F.2d
326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 392 (1958). All of the opinions in
United States v. U.M.W., 330 U.S. 258 (1947), decided prior to Taft-Hartley, assumed
that Norris-La Guardia generally barred an injunction against the breach of a no-
strike clause.
It is sometimes said that the conclusion may be open to question under the
rationale of Lincoln Mills. See comments, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 496, 501 (1958); 71
Harv. L. Rev. 1172, 1175 (1958).
""What that substantive federal law is we cannot know. Until it is elaborated
by the federal courts we assume it does not differ significantly from our own law."
315 P.2d at 33o.
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of a uriiform federal law under Lincoln Mills, will be frustrated as
different results will be reached depending on whether a federal or
state court, and perhaps which state court, handles the case. The un-
certainty of such a development could be greatly diminished by con-
gressional action limiting such suits to federal courts. With only eleven
federal circuits formulating the law there would be less conflict than
with the courts of an additional fifty states also doing so.
It may well be argued that the state and federal courts have exer-
cised concurrent jurisdiction in a number of fields successfully' But in
these areas there was in existence a great body of state law to which
Congress could refer in formulating legsilation.25 To pre-empt those
fields would be to deprive state courts of asserting traditional jurisdic-
tion in an area where they have developed a great body of law. But in
the field of "labor relations the state law is of comparatively recent ori-
gin and has not developed to an extent comparable to the older com-
mon law doctrines."2 6 Therefore, pre-emption in this field would not be
depriving the states from asserting jurisdiction where they have de-
veloped a sizeable body of law.
It should also be noted that collective bargaining agreements often
contain provisions which, if violated, constitute unfair labor prac-
tices as well as breaches of agreement. A contract may provide that
the employer agrees not to discriminate against any employee because
of union activity. Discrimination against an employee would then
be both a violation of section 8(a)(3 )27 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act and a breach of contract. Where the underlying conduct
which constitutes the breach is also an unfair labor practice the
National Labor Relations Board will have exclusive jurisdiction.28
This is a delicate distinction that the District Courts would be in a
better position than the state courts to handle, as the District Courts
'The Federal Employer's Liability Act, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51
(1952), required application of the laws of negligence. See Mishkin, The Variousness
of Federal Law: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State
Rules For Decision, io5 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797 (1957).
"'57 Colum. L. Rev. 1123, 1137 (1957).
27The Labor Management Relations Act provides that an employer will be
guilty of an unfair labor practice:
"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization." Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § 8(a)(3), 61
Stat. 140 (194!7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(3) (1958).
28See Dunau, Contractual Problems of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional
Problems, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 52 (1957).
